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Beyond Battelle: Let’s broaden the dialogue of Iowa economic health

As Iowa legislators this week start work on a course to a more robust and diversified economy, discussion already has focused on a new privately funded report, Iowa’s Re-Envisioned Economic Development Roadmap.[1]

Produced by Battelle Technology Partnership Practice and commissioned by the Iowa Partnership for Economic Progress,[2] the $400,000 report makes some important points and deserves a careful look.

It focuses heavily on the importance of business to promote economic activity, but its core message acknowledges the significant role of public investments in providing the foundations for Iowa’s economy. This includes the education system needed to develop the skills, talents and capacity of the current and future workforce, including those who will become the future entrepreneurs and leaders for the 21st century.

While the report acknowledges the centrality of an educated and skilled workforce and a high quality of life to making Iowa an environment for business to flourish, it places very little focus upon how government can deliver on that role. It falls to government to educate that future workforce — at the early childhood, primary and secondary, and higher education levels.

The report does not adequately address the challenges Iowa faces in creating that higher skill level among its emerging workforce — in particular, the need to address lagging and stagnant educational achievement. To do so takes resources, and the report’s emphasis is to leave in place a business subsidy structure that has increasingly reduced the state’s ability to meet those needs.

The report itself was overseen largely by business leaders and economic development agency staff. However, these are not the only stakeholders in Iowa’s economic future; many others need to engage in the dialogue about Iowa government’s role in economic development.

The Battelle Report raises one perspective on economic development. Lawmakers, the media and the public need to insist that other perspectives and expertise also are fully considered and vetted.

More Iowans need an invitation to the table.

08-Bruner-5464Charles Bruner is executive director of the Child & Family Policy Center, www.cfpciowa.org, part of the Iowa Fiscal Partnership, www.iowafiscal.org.

Note: This piece also ran as an “Iowa View” in The Des Moines Register, Jan. 14, 2015.

[1] Technology Partnership Practice, Battelle Memorial Institute, December 2014, “Iowa’s Re-Envisioned Economic Development Roadmap.” http://www.iowaeconomicdevelopment.com/battelle
[2] Iowa Economic Development Authority, News release, Dec. 18, 2014, “Governor, IPEP Release Findings of 2014 Battelle Report, a New Economic Development Roadmap for Iowa,” http://www.iowaeconomicdevelopment.com/newsdetails/6051

State Policy and Economic Growth

Public investments require public funding. And therein lies the rub. A continual diet of tax cuts deprives state and local governments of the ability to adequately fund public services.

IFP Backgrounder

State Policy and Economic Growth

Innovation, Education, Infrastructure: The Things that Matter

PDF (2 pages)

We’re all for building a strong state economy with good jobs. But we get a lot of different answers when we pose the question: “What kinds of state policies are going to get us there?” Increasingly over the past 20 years, the easy answer, and the one that prevails most often, has been “tax cuts.” But what really determines how a state economy grows or declines? Can we really expect state policy to change the course of economic growth?

In the short run, a state is largely at the mercy of national and global economic trends: Its economic structure and resource base will largely determine its economic fortunes. Over the past five years, for example, states with a strong base in oil and natural gas did well in spite of the recession. States heavily invested in industries severely impacted by the global recession suffered greatly. State policy was a minor actor compared to global economic trends.

But that doesn’t mean state policy doesn’t matter. In the longer term, substantial evidence shows that two factors are most important in explaining why some states experience greater growth in per capita income than others: the level of education of the workforce and the rate of innovation and new business formation (with the latter in large measure dependent upon the former).[i] Tax policies, and particularly tax incentives that are specifically geared to promoting business growth, play very small roles and can also distort the free market system by benefiting and subsidizing one activity over another. The quality of a state’s infrastructure also matters — businesses need good roads, reliable water and sewer systems, and public safety. To attract workers we need the kinds of things that make Iowa a place where people want to raise families, including good public services, schools, and recreation opportunities.

Public investments require public funding. And therein lies the rub. A continual diet of tax cuts deprives state and local governments of the ability to adequately fund public services. About three-fifths of the state budget goes to education alone, and education, health, infrastructure and public safety account for a majority of the budgets of local governments.

So what about taxes on business? How much do they matter? When deciding where to locate or expand, a firm will consider a wide range of factors that affect its costs, productivity or sales: access to markets and to suppliers; transportation costs; energy costs; access to a pool of labor with appropriate education and skills; wage rates; health care costs; the quality of schools, recreation opportunities, climate and other amenities important in attracting skilled labor; the quality of state and local government services, such as public safety and infrastructure; and state and local taxes.

State and local business taxes, it turns out, are just a small share of costs. In fact, for the average firm, all state and local taxes paid by businesses together amount to just 1.8 percent of total costs.[ii] The simple fact is this: Changes in tax policy provide very little leverage over the economic decisions of firms. Other cost factors predominate.

It should be no surprise then that scholarly research on the effect of taxes on location decisions of firms provides no consensus. Many find no effect, and those that do often come to contradictory conclusions about which taxes matter and which ones don’t. Among the studies finding some effect, the influence of taxes is generally very small.[iii]

The upshot is that tax cuts and incentives are expensive. They actually change business decisions for only a small share of the firms taking advantage of them; tax cuts and incentives mostly go to subsidize firms for doing what they would have done anyway. In some instances, tax incentives actually create unfair advantages to the recipient firms that compete with existing enterprises within the state  In general, tax cuts and incentives  are simply too expensive to ever pay for themselves. Furthermore, even the limited effectiveness found by some researchers is called into question when you consider that states must balance their budgets. The cuts in services required to finance tax breaks will reduce or even eliminate any gain from the small amount of new economic activity generated. Businesses won’t invest in Iowa if they can’t be sure that the school system will produce the workforce they need in the future, and if they can’t count on a quality infrastructure being maintained.

We should remember how Iowa became the place it is, the place so many love and where they want to raise a family. Generations before us made the right decisions to build schools and roads, to support a public university system that is an engine of research and innovation, and to create safe communities that support families. We cannot afford to weaken these commitments; no one wants to see the state slide toward mediocrity.

A smart approach to state economic policy must begin by recognizing the futility of pursuing a single-minded tax-cutting approach, and by recognizing the importance of a healthy public sector in supporting economic growth. State policy should focus on the fundamental responsibilities of state and local government to provide a quality education from early childhood through graduate school, to build and maintain the roads and other services that our citizens and businesses alike depend upon. We need to stop pretending that we can tax-cut our way to prosperity. To finance ever-expanding tax breaks to businesses by cutting support for education, forcing ever higher tuition and increasing class sizes, is a formula for long-term economic decline.


[i]   See Bauer, Paul W., Mark E. Schweitzer and Scott Shane, “State Growth Empirics: The Long-Run Determinants of State Income Growth,” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working Paper, May 2006; and Noah Berger and Peter Fisher, A Well-Educated Workforce is Key to State Prosperity, Economic Analysis and Research Network Report, August 22, 2013, at http://www.epi.org/publication/states-education-productivity-growth-foundations/.

[ii]   This is based on data averaged over three years 2005-2007 from two sources: U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, Integrated Business Data for all U.S. Corporations, partnerships, and non-farm proprietorships, showing total deductions for business costs on tax returns, at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/bustaxstats/article/0,,id=152029,00.html ; and a 2009 report by the Council on State Taxation, which estimates total state and local taxes paid by businesses, available at http://www.cost.org/Page.aspx?id=69654.

[iii]   See Peter Fisher, Corporate Taxes and State Economic Growth, the Iowa Policy Project, December 2010, revised April 2013, at: www.iowapolicyproject.org/2011docs/110209-IFP-corptaxes.pdf;‎ and Michael Mazerov, Academic Research Lacks Consensus on the Impact of State Tax Cuts on Economic Growth: A Reply to the Tax Foundation. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, April 2013, at www.cbpp.org/files/6-17-13sfp.pdf.

Fisher: With economic development, some bad ideas never die

Peter FisherBy Peter Fisher, Iowa Policy Project

On Wednesday, the Iowa House proved that bipartisanship is no guarantor of good policy.

On a vote of 87-9, the House approved House File 641, which would authorize a new and wasteful incentive program that would divert money from the state general fund to support hotel and retail projects in cities. So we will be taking money that should be supporting state investments in education, health, the environment, public safety and other services and using it to subsidize hotel developers and retail strip malls. All in the name of “economic development.”

Cities already have more than enough ability to divert taxes to development projects through property tax TIFs and abatements. There is no need for additional diversions of revenue from other jurisdictions.

The House bill would authorize any city or county to establish “Reinvestment Districts.” From the date of establishment onward for the next 25 years, 4 cents of the 6-cent statewide sales tax, and all 5 cents of the state hotel-motel tax, from all “new” sales or room rentals would be diverted from the state general fund to the city for use in the district.

What uses? Pretty much anything; any building, public or private, could qualify for a subsidy, and there is no limit on how much of the cost of a project can be subsidized.

“New sales” are sales from a business that first got a state sales-tax permit (or hotel-motel tax permit) after the date the district was established. Given the high rate of turnover among retail businesses, it is not hard to imagine a scenario in which most of the sales taxes in a district are diverted from the state general fund even though there has been little additional economic activity, or even decline. All that is needed is that old businesses are replaced by new ones, even if that means replacing an Applebees with a pawn shop.

Why will a city ever again be content to finance commercial redevelopment on its own, or with property tax TIFs alone? Why will a developer ever again finance a project entirely from private sources — try to remember, if you can, when that was the norm — when he or she can just ask the city to get the money from the state?

More importantly, what will become of market standards? While every legislator who voted for the bill surely believes in free markets and private enterprise, this measure undermines markets.

There was a time, before the incentive wars got out of hand, when a project had to stand on its own — there had to be a sufficient market to support it, and banks had to be convinced that revenues would be sufficient to repay the loans.

No more. Now local government officials are determined to force development to happen when it can’t stand on its own, creating oversupply that hurts existing businesses. Or the private sector happily rakes in all the new incentive cash to do something it would have done anyway.

Those are really the only two alternatives for a local market activity: either market conditions support it and it can be financed privately, or the market can’t support it, and the city uses taxpayer money to force overbuilding.

We can hope that this bill gets careful scrutiny before it goes any further.

 

Peter S. Fisher is research director of the Iowa Policy Project in Iowa City. He is professor emeritus of urban and regional planning at the University of Iowa.

This guest opinion ran in the April 29, 2013, Iowa City Press-Citizen, and also appeared on the Iowa Policy Points blog, www.iowapolicypoints.org.

Some bad ideas never die

Posted April 24th, 2013 to Blog
Peter Fisher

Peter Fisher

The Iowa House today proved that bipartisanship is no guarantor of good policy. On a vote of 87-9, the House approved HF 641, which would authorize a new and wasteful incentive program that would divert money from the state general fund to support hotel and retail projects in cities. So we will be taking money that should be supporting state investments in education, health, the environment, public safety, and other services, and using it to subsidize hotel developers and retail strip malls. All in the name of “economic development.”

Cities already have more than enough ability to divert taxes to development projects through property tax TIFs and abatements. There is no need for additional diversions of revenue from other jurisdictions.

The House bill would authorize any city or county to establish “Reinvestment Districts.” From the date of establishment onward for the next 25 years, 4 cents of the 6-cent statewide sales tax, and all 5 cents of the state hotel-motel tax, from all “new” sales or room rentals would be diverted from the state general fund to the city for use in the district. What uses? Pretty much anything; any building, public or private, could qualify for a subsidy, and there is no limit on how much of the cost of a project can be subsidized.

“New sales” are sales from a business that first got a state sales-tax permit (or hotel-motel tax permit) after the date the district was established. Given the high rate of turnover among retail businesses, it is not hard to imagine a scenario in which most of the sales taxes in a district are diverted from the state general fund even though there has been little additional economic activity, or even decline. All that is needed is that old businesses are replaced by new ones, even if that means replacing an Applebees with a pawn shop.

Why will a city ever again be content to finance commercial redevelopment on their own, or with property tax TIFs alone? Why will a developer ever again finance a project entirely from private sources – try to remember, if you can, when that was the norm – when he or she can just ask the city to get the money from the state?

More importantly, what will become of market standards? While every legislator who voted for the bill surely believes in free markets and private enterprise, this measure undermines markets. There was a time, before the incentive wars got out of hand, when a project had to stand on its own – there had to be a sufficient market to support it, and banks had to be convinced that revenues would be sufficient to repay the loans. No more. Now local government officials are determined to force development to happen when it can’t stand on its own, creating oversupply that hurts existing businesses. Or the private sector happily rakes in all the new incentive cash to do something it would have done anyway. Those are really the only two alternatives for a local market activity: either market conditions support it and it can be financed privately, or the market can’t support it, and the city uses taxpayer money to force overbuilding.

We can hope that this bill gets careful scrutiny before it goes any further.

Posted by Peter Fisher, Research Director


ALEC’s ‘Tax Myths Debunked’ Misses the Mark

Posted February 11th, 2013 to Budget, Corporate Taxes, Taxes

3-page PDF of this report

By Peter Fisher

The American Legislative Exchange Council has for several years attempted to provide factual underpinnings for its right-wing policy agenda through an annual publication called Rich States, Poor States. This report and similar ALEC documents have come under increasing attack in recent years for their shoddy research methods and misleading conclusions. ALEC has now struck back at its critics in a report by Eric Fruits and Randall Pozdena called Tax Myths Debunked.[i] A portion of that document is devoted to research released last November by Good Jobs First and the Iowa Policy Project in the report Selling Snake Oil to the States: The American Legislative Exchange Council’s Flawed Prescriptions for Prosperity.[ii] Some of the key findings in that report were released in the summer of 2012 in a short piece called The Doctor is Out to Lunch.[iii] It is the latter piece that is referenced in Tax Myths Debunked rather than the full research report; we refer herein, however, to the full document and use its shorthand title, Selling Snake Oil. The full report was known to ALEC well before Tax Myths was released.[iv]

The first criticism leveled in Tax Myths is directed at an analysis in Selling Snake Oil of the factors leading to economic growth and rising incomes among the states between 2007 and 2012. In that analysis we argued that state economic structure — the composition of a state’s economy — is likely to play an important role in the short run in determining how well the economy fares; states more heavily invested in 2007 in sectors poised to grow in the succeeding five years would be expected to do better than states with a concentration of jobs in sectors that would be hit hard by the recession. Thus it was important to control for economic structure in a statistical analysis that attempts to identify whether the policy prescriptions of ALEC performed as advertised, leading to growth and prosperity. ALEC, in Tax Myths, appears to have completely misunderstood what was done in our analysis; their criticism seems to be based on the assumption that our model was predicting changes in the share of employment by sector. Instead we were simply using 2007 economic structure — measured by employment shares — to predict rates of growth in overall state GDP, employment, and personal income. Their criticisms make no sense and are completely off base; 2012 state GDP cannot be a cause of 2007 economic structure, which is the circularity they argue undermines our analysis.

Second, they argue that economists have found a strong relationship between tax policy and economic health, and cite two pieces of research in support. In Selling Snake Oil, we devote several paragraphs to a discussion of the many reviews of dozens of research articles over the past 30 years that have led to the conclusion that business taxes have, at best, a small effect on business location decisions. In our piece, we looked at the consensus among a large number of economists who have examined this question; in Tax Myths, they found two that supported their position and ignored the rest.

The third criticism is directed at several scatter plots and associated correlations that were presented in Selling Snake Oil.  In those charts we were illustrating how states that were ranked high or low by ALEC in the first edition of Rich States, Poor States in 2007 actually performed in the time since then. Did the states that ALEC ranked high on their Economic Outlook Ranking (EOR) actually perform better than others? Since all ALEC provided was the state rankings (not an index number showing their relative strength or weakness), we correlated those rankings with the measures of performance that ALEC emphasizes: growth in GDP, employment, and income. ALEC argues a technical point here: The formula used to calculate the correlation between two continuous variables (the Pearson coefficient) is different from the formula used to calculate the correlation between two rankings (the Spearman coefficient). We had one ranked variable (the EOR), and one continuous variable, and used the Pearson coefficient.

130211-table1To respond to this criticism, we converted all of the performance variables to ranks first, and then calculated the Spearman coefficient. The conclusions were the same (Table 1). Where there was no statistically significant relation using the Pearson formula (as was the case when we looked at the EOR as a predictor of growth in GDP or jobs), there was also no significant relation using the Spearman. Where there was a statistically significant and negative relation (high ranked states have lower per capita and median family incomes) using the Pearson measure, the same result occurred with the Spearman. In only one instance did results change: Our original analysis showed a negative but not statistically significant relation between EOR and the growth in state revenues. The analysis substituting the state rank in revenue growth and using the Spearman coefficient found a negative effect as well, but this time the effect was stronger and statistically significant.

Finally, Tax Myths presents an alternative to the analyses in Selling Snake Oil, correlating the state EOR each year with the June value of the “state coincident indices” published monthly by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia for each state. The coincident indices are based on four measures of the health of the state economy: non-farm employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, the unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements. ALEC found a strong correlation between a state’s EOR and the value of the coincident index.

The state coincident indices are designed for tracking the course of a state’s economy over time — whether it is sliding into recession or on a path to recovery — and are pegged to a value of 100 for every state as of 1992. They are used to compare states, but only in terms of the changes in the index over time. So the value of the index as of 2008 is a measure of that state’s growth rate from 1992 to 2008, since every state started at 100. However, a high value for state X in 2008 does not mean that state X has a healthier economy in some sense than state Y with a lower value in 2008, because state Y could have started out with a much higher level of prosperity in 1992 and still have higher incomes and wages than state X in 2008, despite growing more slowly. Furthermore, the correlations performed by Fruits and Pozdena are taken as evidence that ALEC policies, as represented by EOR, cause economic health, but they have done it backwards, in effect trying to demonstrate that conformance to ALEC policies in 2008 caused states to grow more rapidly from 1992 to 2008! So why didn’t they look at the policies in place as of 2008 and see if they predicted economic growth from 2008 to 2012? The answer is, because the correlations between the EOR in 2008 and changes in the state coincident index subsequent to that are near zero. This is not the result they were looking for.

In Selling Snake Oil, we argued that a more sophisticated approach to identifying the effects of a state’s EOR would entail a statistical analysis that controlled for economic structure, as described earlier.  In fact, a Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank economist in an article about the state coincident index explains how state economic structure is an important determinant of the path of the state economy, as measured by changes in that index over time.[v] We decided to see how the coincident index measure of economic performance fared in our regression model. So we used our 2007 economic structure variables, along with either the EOR or several key measures that are components of the EOR, to predict the rate of improvement in a state’s coincident index from 2007 to 2012. The results were much the same as our previous analysis, using growth in GDP, employment, or income as the performance measures. In other words, when state economic structure is controlled for, none of the ALEC policy variables, including the EOR, had a statistically significant effect on the rate of improvement in the state’s economy over this period.

In sum, nothing in Tax Myths actually undercuts any of the analyses or conclusions in Selling Snake Oil. In fact the authors’ misinterpretation of our use of economic structure variables and misuse of the state coincident indices serves only to further confirm the shoddiness of the research sponsored by ALEC.




[i] Eric Fruits and Randall J. Pozdena, “Tax Myths Debunked.” American Legislative Exchange Council, 2013. http://www.alec.org/publications/tax-myths-debunked/

[ii] Peter Fisher with Greg LeRoy and Philip Mattera, “Selling Snake Oil to the States: The American Legislative Exchange Council’s Flawed Prescriptions for Prosperity.” Good Jobs First and the Iowa Policy Project, November 2012. http://www.iowapolicyproject.org/2012docs/121128-snakeoiltothestates.pdf

[iii] Peter Fisher, “The Doctor is Out to Lunch: ALEC’s Recommendations Wrong Prescription for State Prosperity.” Iowa Policy Project, July 24, 2012. http://www.iowapolicyproject.org/2012Research/120724-rsps.html

[iv] The author of the ALEC report evaluated by the “Selling Snake Oil” report was quoted in a news story the day of its release, November 28, 2012, by Mike Wiser of the Quad-City Times, Davenport, Iowa. http://qctimes.com/news/local/report-iowa-tax-policy-might-hurt-state-economy/article_6f578494-39d5-11e2-9519-0019bb2963f4.html

[v] Theodore Crone, “What a New Set of Indexes Tells Us About State and National Business Cycles.” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Business Review Q1 2006. http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/business-review/2006/q1/Q1_06_NewIndexes.pdf

 

Peter Fisher is Research Director of the Iowa Policy Project (IPP), a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that engages the public in an informed discussion of policy alternatives by providing fact-based analysis of public policy issues.

Fisher holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and is professor emeritus of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Iowa in Iowa City. He is a national expert on public finance and has served as a consultant to the Iowa Department of Economic Development, the State of Ohio, and the Iowa Business Council. His reports are regularly published in State Tax Notes and refereed journals. His book Grading Places: What Do the Business Climate Rankings Really Tell Us? was published by the Economic Policy Institute in 2005.

 

IFP News: Selling Snake Oil to the States

IPP-Good Jobs First Study:

ALEC’s Advice to States on Jobs Is Actually a Recipe for Stagnation and Wage Suppression

View report (PDF) from Iowa Policy Project/Iowa Fiscal Partnership and Good Jobs First
Download this news release (2-page PDF)

snakeoiltothestates-3inWashington, D.C. (Nov. 28, 2012) — A new study finds that state tax and regulatory policies recommended by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) fail to promote stronger job creation or income growth, and actually predict a worse performance.

Since ALEC first published its annual Rich States, Poor States study with its Economic Outlook Ranking in 2007, states that were rated better have actually done worse economically.

Those are the key findings of “Selling Snake Oil to the States,” a study published today by Good Jobs First and the Iowa Policy Project and freely available online at http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/snakeoiltothestates. It was released at a press conference the same week ALEC holds its annual fall meeting in Washington, D.C.

“We tested ALEC’s claims against actual economic results,” said Dr. Peter Fisher, research director of the Iowa Policy Project and primary author of the study. “We conclude that eliminating progressive taxes, suppressing wages, and cutting public services are actually a recipe for economic inequality, declining incomes, and undermining public infrastructure and education that really matter for long-term economic growth.”

The study dissects the methodology used by ALEC’s lead author Arthur Laffer and his co-authors. It finds that their arguments and evidence range from deeply flawed to nonexistent, consistently ignoring decades of peer-reviewed academic research. Instead, Laffer et al repeatedly engage in methodologically primitive approaches such as two-factor correlations and comparing arbitrary small numbers of states instead of all 50.

The study finds that the composition of a state’s economy — whether it has disproportionate shares of high-growth or low-growth industries — was a far better predictor of a state’s relative success over the past five years.

“State corporate income taxes average less than one-fifth of 1 percent of the average company’s costs,” said Fisher. “The ALEC/Laffer studies would have state leaders ignore site-location basics and disinvest public goods that benefit all employers.”

Good Jobs First is a nonprofit, nonpartisan resource promoting accountability in economic development and smart growth for working families. It was founded in 1998 and is based in Washington, D.C.

The Iowa Policy Project is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization promoting public policy that fosters economic opportunity while safeguarding the health and well-being of Iowa’s people and environment. It was formed in 2001 and is based in Iowa City.

Keys to Fairly Assess the Effective Return on Investment from Public Business Subsidies

IFP BACKGROUNDER

Basic RGB

 

The following are key factors to assessing the return on investment of public economic development programs, tax credits and expenditures.

Most importantly, it is critical to establish a credible way to estimate the degree to which any state economic development program, tax credit, or expenditure actually produced the economic activity and the degree to which the activity would have occurred anyway.This must go beyond beneficiaries’ claims about the value of the business subsidy, to hard evidence that a subsidy or set of so-called “incentives” tipped the balance to assure at least a portion of the investment. After this determination, a methodology for calculating public ROIs must address these key issues:

  • Calculate public investments in terms of public returns, not increased overall economic activity. Public returns involve increased revenue to the state (in taxes and fees) as a result of the increased business activity, and are the way to measure public (tax dollar) investments for their returns.
  • Establish a reasonable time frame for making these estimates, with returns in future years appropriately discounted. A public investment, like a private one, needs to produce returns over a reasonable time period, and future returns should be appropriately discounted.
  • Compare the return on investment in economic development expenditures with the potential gains from alternative uses of the funds. A proper analysis would account for the lost opportunities that would come from making those investments elsewhere.
  • Estimate the impact of the investment on the direct level of economic activity that is projected to occur, including any potential for displacing existing economic activity. The public interest is in net new economic activity, not displacement of one activity with another, which also can provide unfair advantages to new over existing businesses. Displacement occurs when a subsidy simply enables one business to capture an existing firm’s share of a state market that is not expanding.
  • Incorporate additional public costs, as well as benefits, from the economic activity. There may be additional public sector costs that have to be factored in, particularly for additional demands on public services and business-related infrastructure needs or workforce expansions when new economic activity draws people (and service users) to Iowa from outside the state.
  • Only count any return once, even if multiple, independent investments were made to produce it. When multiple economic development subsidies are used to produce increased economic activity, the public return from that activity needs to be apportioned among those multiple subsidy programs, so it is not counted multiple times.
  • Recognize that ROI is only one factor to consider in determining public purpose and benefit.  Some investments can produce economic gain, but at a public cost (environmental degradation or public health and safety). Others can produce public benefits in those areas.  Although these do not have a monetary value, they are important considerations in making public investments and need to be recognized in ROI analyses.
  • Audit for impact and accuracy. Estimates and claims are only estimates and claims; there needs to be monitoring for actual impact, use, and achievement of public goals.
This is a summary of an Iowa Fiscal Partnership Policy Brief, “Bang for the Buck: Calculating the State’s Return on Investments in Economic Development,” by Charles Bruner and Peter S. Fisher (January 27, 2010). www.iowafiscal.org